He claims that most of these vulnerabilities are not an issue at all, or have been fixed earlier, etc. I can clearly see the improvement of the AI models, but based on this youtube video it's very plausible that these AI labs rush to announce a result without further understanding of the underlying problems. I wonder what's the quality here in this article.
There are humans like this and they are some of the most catastrophic people to have on a project, I actively avoid them.
I'm sure LLMs are different.
How do I know I didn't learn hallucinations?
Because based on that knowledge, I've produced code that works as intended.
Or at the very least, you were interested in the subjects in question and just never had the time or other resources to learn them.
As such, I'm learning through motivated, self-directed, focused exploration, using the AI to answer questions, run experiments, explain findings, investigate surprises, and explore new directions to research, all grounded in concrete data related to those goals.
The data and our results on it are what keep us honest. The data is also what helps understanding nuances and building intuition because the AI can explain outcomes in the context of samples data points that you can reason about independently.
The difference between YOLO vibe-coding and engineering is understanding. I think this is the future of learning and skill-building.
They are trying to sell this false myth of machines so good they can replace any human expert, and they buy this BS themselves, so, instead of actually learning something and/or confirming results with institutions of experts (what's left of them anyway) they just rush out a PR piece knowing the unwitting public and VCs won't care enough to look into the validity of anything themselves anyway.
The whole thing is a gamble on whether or not they can convince the world that a fancy word machine substitutes for deep experience and expertise.
(To be clear, the fancy word machines are still very useful tools, but they are not adequate replacements for knowing humans).
If that's the case, that's the primary example that I've seen in many places.
God, I'd hate to be on the receiving end of their bug/issue submissions.
The workflow for a defender basically goes: Claude do a security audit on this codebase, use the harness / skills I built on how to do security audits.. pick the best suitable audit strategy, methods.. use the tooling and reporting structures.
Claude refuses, GPT refuses. Grok, goes further, but refuses to make a working PoC.. a requirement because AI models make stuff up and without a PoC there is no proof. GLM-5.3 / Kimi to the rescue and completes the job the "smarter" models refused.
So we as defenders are refused by the best models, on our own codebase
I've heard people getting jammed up with Claude refusing to update DNS..
The situation is pretty insane right now.
All projects need security and writing code means taking security decisions, you can't untangle both.
The only things worse than the CVE getting dropped in our laps with little warning was having Claude run into its safeguards which slowed my progress in actually protecting our customers.
Last week Claude (and Codex) also refused to help write unit tests around existing code because it touched on authentication. I was able to ladder between them past everywhere they got stuck but today I went straight to GLM after hitting safeguards.
Golden guns don't keep you safe from silver bullets.
These models are obviously getting used to commit acts which would be criminal if done with intent (https://www.felonybench.com), handing everyone a digital version of a machine gun means everyone catches strays.
Worse: every capability the SOTA models demonstrate is available in an open weight model 3 months later, so we're all catching strays already, and it's only the exact policies you're unhappy about which gave critical infrastructure any prep time.
And recall, absent demonstrations of capabilities (and sometimes even with demonstrations), lots of people respond dismissively to these warnings; before OpenAI had actually hacked into HuggingFace, people thought it was "science fiction" that an AI would find and exploit novel zero-days in its own sandbox.
That's the point. Slowing people down. Hackers aren't "not people".
> You can't ever get rid of the arms race between defender and attacker.
Yes you can, and by doing exactly what you're complaining about:
And if you do want that access, you have to verify your identity, and do a bunch of other things
How exactly does requiring people to identify themselves actually protect anyone or slow them down? Their identity system doesn't even work reliably (it's just your classic "verify your ID" scheme), and it failed to verify my ID no matter how I did it, so in the end I gave up. Even assuming it was reliable, I don't see how it stops bad actors from doing it, since we all know how easy it is for most sufficiently resourceful actors to forge IDs, and I suspect these digital ID verification services have all kinds of vulnerabilities that would make them easier to bypass compared to the tools the state has to prove an ID is legit. For the higher tiers of CVP there may be more requirements, but do you seriously think these companies aren't just using AI to verify those tiers too?
Yes, agreed the US agencies will have the best. But not from Anthropic: recall the White House unlawfully blacklisted Anthropic when Anthropic dared say no to their models getting used in certain ways, and that Anthropic was given an order to stop supplying to any non-American despite the large number of non-Americans on their staff.
So for this:
> Instead of building a tool to fix security issues, they've essentially built a cyber weapon for offensive use.
They did both. That it's a machine gun with an overly-cautious safety system isn't great, but it's also a tool and as a tool is better than either a machine gun with no safety system or just giving no-questions-asked direct control to just the US government.
No-questions-asked access would be from the other AI vendors.
None of this is for you; it's for money. It's someone else's empire. Cybersecurity is a farce, and western culture would quickly recover from a complete collapse, and be better off for it.
And then others would emerge, and the cat mouse game of hackers and viruses in the 2000s would pick up again. We had a bit of a calm period when Anti virus programs in windows didnt do much anymore
Their capital isn't your body armour.
Anything it costs them has all the impact of an ambulance at the bottom of a cliff, when we could have a fence at the top.
> The collapse of the current Google/Microsoft security and management duopoly would be less impactful on the average computer user than the death of flash player.
Add Cisco (CVE-2026-20213), NGINX (CVE-2026-27654), the Linux kernel (CVE-2026-31554), ImageMagick (CVE-2026-33901), FreeRDP (CVE-2026-40033), OpenSSL (CVE-2026-45447), Suricata (CVE-2026-45751), FreeBSD (CVE-2026-4747), PostgreSQL (CVE-2026-6479), and Mozilla Firefox/Thunderbird NSS library (CVE-2026-6772).
> None of this is for you; it's for money. It's someone else's empire. Cybersecurity is a farce, and western culture would quickly recover from a complete collapse, and be better off for it.
Cybersecurity is indeed a farce; one does not put out a dumpster fire by pouring on gasoline. Well, not unless it's a huge amount, and then you've got gasoline everywhere off-gassing and one spark from being much worse.
Due to tech being over-sold as a solution to everything, it has been so heavily integrated in our infrastructure that "a complete collapse" would be devastating.
We see small, limited, isolated incidents already, just from Ukraine blowing up Yandex servers and by extension knocking out random chunks of Russian economy, or unknown hackers switching French/Dutch/US fridges to defrost overnight spoiling the food, or messing with water control systems in (fortunately small) reservoirs, Revolut not working for a bit when one European DC went down, and some stupidity where a root signing certificate had a private key of "4" for 18 months without anyone noticing.
Do this everywhere all at once, and it's likely we get mass blackouts, banking in general stops, software updates and signing can't be trusted to undo the mess. It's anywhere from "really bad" to "civilisational crisis" if it dropped in unexpected and unprepared for.
And in general you can have 5 boxes verified and be surprised what comes out of them calling each other. Number of boxes is growing and possible interactions is exp. I don't think formal verification solves much.
The prompt I used was "Goal: rework to reduce the attack surface. Process: move features into feature-flag Rust crates. Output: build a minimal version. Questions: Ask me anything."
This past weekend, Claude Fable/Opus/Sonnet together successfully refactored the whole Vix IDE codebase into many separate Rust crates and Cargo features.
This refactor enables a security-oriented user to pick and choose, and also makes it easier for a security auditor to look at one capability at a time.
If you're curious you can see the commit messages by Claude Sonnet. IMHO they're reasonably good.
We're strongly pushing for a move to a mix of Codex and open models at my workplace because of Anthropic's ridiculous nanny-ing.
It's a 10T BTW.
You might have a dislike of react and that's fine, but it's not adding any significant attack surface to a project.
Nextjs on the other hand...
I had a quick look around and it's actually ~1000 lines apparently, in React 19.
Do you dispute that? If so, why?
It’s a different interface and the axiomatic layers are not the same.
React expects a tree of nodes that will map to the UI and build on that to add reactivity. And that’s what the major GUI platforms do offer (QT, the web dom, Android, iOS,…).
The terminal is a grid of characters modfied by the cursor concept. It is also modal (although most TUI uses one mode). What the cursor can do, and how the grid is rendered is terminal dependent (even though most current ones try to follow xterm-256color).
Using React on top of that is a technical bad idea.
That's mighty white of you, it's a dirty job but someone's got to tell others what experiences and feelings are fine
The fuck kind of racism is this? Calling people white for using basic rhetoric?
Missing an apostrophe? A human wrote this! Love to see it.
This sounds so arrogant, lol. I know it actually means that they red team the frontier AI models (which is a reasonable claim), but it looks like they are claiming to be the best red team in the world
I'm not that hot on the idea of open models, but having something dangled in front of you but suddenly unable to verify is not a good feeling.
With the right amount of coaxing you can sometimes get it to reproduce a PoC with a "TDD first" approach to fixing, but often now that gets blocked too.
Propriety models are clearly subsidised by enterprise API contracts, so it makes sense to milk that for all its worth, provided one steers clear of any lock in so the option to switch is always there.
Jumping to spending time managing and self-hosting open models is a nice ideal but I think it's a distraction to jump on that train without proven benefits given the value that other plans deliver.
I don't mean I'm against the idea of open models, they were especially instrumental in Anthropic backing down from the "Fable only initially available 2 weeks" plan, which got extended up until Fable was over-taken by Opus in general usefulness.
It's my view that any company sized appropriately for Teams plan should be milking it for all its worth while it still exists, and it is a waste to lose that opportunity by jumping on open models too early.
If you're a larger enterprise then it would be a very different story, you'd already be paying more forced onto API pricing and would likely have the capacity to have a team look at open models without impacting delivery.
I trust ( although some don't ), Anthropic not to be doing that. I don't trust intermediate providers so much. If you're self-hosting then at least you know exactly what is running and get privacy on top.
Likewise you lose privacy of local hosting, and if it emerged that a provider was training on data they shouldn't be, would you have the necessary legal recourse, that you would going direct to the major model providers?
I think the hackers are just using "not Claude".
I'm with you here, just asking what the proposed stack is here, which you did not include.
If I understand correctly you're saying custom agent and possibly locally run open model, or are you saying no to all LLM / agent use outright? Either is fine, I'm not here to tell you're wrong, I'm just curious about what others are doing.